

Memo for Chairman, JCS. 2 Oct 1962

During my meeting with the JCS on Oct 1, 1962, the question arose as to the contingencies under which military action against Cuba may be necessary and toward which our military planning should be oriented. The following categories would appear to cover the likely possibilities:

- a) Soviet action against Western rights in Berlin calling for a Western response including among other actions a blockade of Communist or other shipping enroute to Cuba.
- b) Evidence that the Castro regime has permitted the positioning of bloc offensive weapon systems on Cuban soil or in Cuban harbors.
- ~~sporadic~~ c) (Guantanamo, or attack on US planes or vessels) ; d) popular uprising;
- e) Cuban armed assistance to subversion; f) decision by Pres that affairs in Cuba have reached a point inconsistent with continuing US national security.

May I have the views of the Chiefs as to the appropriateness of the above list of contingencies and answers to the following:

- a) the operational plans considered appropriate for each contingency...

..We can assume that the political objective in any of these contingencies may be either:

- a) the removal of the threat to US security of Soviet weapon systems in Cuba, or
- b) the removal of the Castro regime and the securing in the island of a new regime responsive to Cuban national desires.

Inasmuch as the Second objective is the more difficult objective and may be required if the first is to be permanently achieved, attention should be focussed upon a capability to assure the second objective.

RSM

Nov 19 W.H. LOAM Nitze notes

...R: Overflights. Effect on Castro. Mikoyan. No high military targets.

McN: Primarily a political question.

McN: Chiefs recommend 3 ports 2 planes

P: Political. Waiting till Press Conf. Does it increase possibility of deal.

G: McCloy Kuz would have said yes if he had authority. Wouldn't fly low.

r: Public impact

B: Public makes little distinction between high and low.

P: Not today. Contingency plan up to date. Is plane at big disadvantage.

McN: What do we do if shot at, not shot down.

B: Quarantine as an alternative.

Ball: Effect on Castro. Establish intention by picking least dangerous place or places. Castro talked about low level. Cubans don't see high.

Th: Possible SAMS will be activated if we shoot. Might add to break if we fire on ack ack. Would prefer attack on Cuba to quarantine.

P: They may respond.

P: India-Chinese question.

Th: Should keep road to coexistence open. Not publicize aid to India. Signs near open break.

P: How can Castro change order. By Thursday. We will down one of 2 roads.

Will have to explain why. Another OAS meeting.

B: Set tomorrow as the end of negotiation track. Renew resolution.

P: How about blockades.

B: Don't decide tomorrow.

Ball: Don't let Soviets too easily (NATO). No adverse reaction to POL. Democracies willing to think other fellow not so bad.

P: How can Khrushchev submit 2d time.

N. Lack of comparability to Western reaction. (Ball Paper).

R: Don't call OAS until press conference.

B. Value of consultation we did do.

P. Don't put up things you won't get. Feel out the L.A.'s on OAS resolution

P. Do we put main emphasis on 28's or surveillance.

Cable from Pres to Stavenoson and McCloy, Nov 5, 1962

...The one serious gap in Kuznetsov's proposal respecting missiles is the absence of any reference to nuclear warheads. Our interest in verifying their absence is intense, and you should emphasize to all Soviets that since K spoke to K_{ox} of the presence of such warheads in Cuba, we need assurance here at least equal to those respecting the missiles themselves. This warhead problem highlights the general importance of post-removal verification in Cuba itself. Forty-two missiles is a plausible number, but for us it can be no more than a Soviet estimate and as such it is not a wholly reliable basis for action. In this connection you should not hesitate to press home with Kuznetsov the fact that Soviet deception remains a major element in our reaction to this whole episode. It may be true, as Kuznetsov argues, that the Soviets have no obligation to tell us exactly what they are doing in a country like Cuba, but what actually happened in this case was that they repeatedly gave us assurances of what they were not doing, which proved absolutely false. These assurances came from highest levels.

~~Yanovskiy~~

(Note date; and Nov 6 reply to K letter of Nov 5, along these lines.)

Your insistence on the removal of IL28s, the unacceptability of any submarine support facility, and obvious involvement in SAM complex are all correct and worth repeating insistently.

...Our OAS approved right of surveillance should be kept intact unless and until a wholly new level of confidence in Communist behavior in Cuba can be established.

3) We do not wholly exclude some form of international inspection of US and other Caribbean installations outside Cuba, at a later stage. Ours is an open society, and the principle of reciprocal inspection is one of high value to us if it can be established in the right circumstances. You should emphasize that such reciprocal inspection can only be considered in return for permanently verified absence of any significant Soviet military presence in Cuba. You might try out the notion of removal of SAM sites in this connection.

Nov 19 W.H. 10AM Nitze notes

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Oct 29, 1962 Nitze notes

Talk to Taylor, so he Taylor understands and Chaffs and Strother, make converts, can't do just by instruction

...Jupiter
1st May at latest

Negotiations with USSR
Get them out bilaterally
Multilateral Med.

Bilaterally with Italy and Turkey
Agree to have Setaf
Agree to replace Corporals with Sergeants, Pershings

Pershings
Mediterranean mult.
 Polaris deployment
 Commitment to NATO
 not to be withdrawn except with agreement of NATO

Thornycroft--Ormsby-Gore

Reasonable--no decision 3 or 4 weeks for review. Cancellation one alternative. Recognized political . . . consider alternatives. Serious problem. Endeavor present to avoid avoid greater problem. Excited, but not govt. would fall.

Also said, sent to Chief 2 days. end of 10 days go to London. If recommendation. asks people to work on alternatives.

1. Hounddog to V Bombers (Harold Brown). Those which were to take Skybolts
2. Other alternatives--Charyk
3. British complete, we subsidize. Production cost for small quantity. Premium not too great.
4. Might Polaris type ~~program~~ program available. Future objectives.